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OKLAHOMA’S SAVE OUR STATE AMENDMENT
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
JOHN T. PARRY∗
Oklahoma sits on the edge of a conflict of laws convulsion.
In November 2010, Oklahoma voters adopted the “Save Our State
Amendment,” which would add the following language to Article VII,
section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution:
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when
exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the
law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the
Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and
if necessary the law of another state of the United States
provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law,
in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the
legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the
courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The
provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the
respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first
impression.1
∗ Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. My thanks to Bill Funk, Janet Levit,
Jenny Logan, Ruth Miller, Jim Nafziger, and Bernie Vail for their comments and to my
Spring 2011 Conflict of Laws class for their thoughts on the Save Our State Amendment.
1. Save Our State Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2010), invalidated by Awad v. Ziriax, 670 P.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Save Our
State Amendment]; see also Summary Results: General Election – November 2, 2010,
OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD., http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html (last visited
Sept. 19, 2011).
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Within weeks, a federal district court entered a preliminary injunction
against certification of the election results for the amendment.2 The only
substantive issue before the court was whether the amendment’s references
to “Sharia Law” violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court held that the
plaintiffs had established a strong likelihood of success on both claims.3
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding with respect to the
Establishment Clause and upheld the preliminary injunction on the same
basis, without considering the Free Exercise Clause claim.4
As this article goes to press, the case is back in district court. An
amended complaint has brought in new plaintiffs and added two new
claims.5 The first new claim contends that the Save Our State Amendment
violates due process and equal protection principles—specifically the
fundamental right to marry—by creating a difference in status between
persons married in another country and persons “who are married
ceremonially in another state or in Oklahoma.”6 The second new claim
asserts a violation of the Supremacy Clause because people who are
married in another country will not be able to invoke international
conventions or customary international law to gain recognition of their
marriages.7 The amended complaint also asserts that the “Sharia Law”
provisions of the Save Our State Amendment are not severable from the
rest of the amendment.8 Defendants have filed an answer that denies all
claims for relief, and they have specifically asserted that the amendment is
severable.9
Most of the reaction to the Save Our State Amendment mirrors the
federal litigation. It focuses on the amendment’s references to “Sharia
Law” and the constitutional issues relating to those references.10 The
international law aspects of the amendment also receive attention, albeit a
2. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
3. Id. at 1306-07.
4. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
5. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Awad v. Ziriaz,
No. CIV-10-1186-M (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2012).
6. Id. at 30-31.
7. Id. at 31.
8. Id.
9. See Answer to First Amended Complaint of Defendants, Awad, No. CIV-10-1186M (W.D. Okla. Aug. 16, 2012); Joint Status Report and Discovery Plan at 4, Awad, No.
CIV-10-1186-M (W.D. Okla., Oct. 29, 2012).
10. For discussion of this reaction, see John T. Parry, Oklahoma’s Save Our State
Amendment: Two Issues for the Appeal, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 161, 162 (2012).
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lesser amount. Commentators have also noted the overlaps between the
Save Our State Amendment and legislation proposed or adopted in other
states.11 This essay takes a different perspective. It approaches the Save
Our State Amendment from a conflict of laws perspective and treats it
primarily as a choice of law statute.12
One reason for this approach to the amendment is that, notwithstanding
the results of the federal litigation so far, portions of it may end up going
into effect. In the preliminary injunction proceedings, both the District
Court and the Tenth Circuit concluded that First Amendment doctrine
prevents implementation of the Save Our State Amendment’s references to
“Sharia Law.” That conclusion is likely to stand, but it does not apply to
the rest of the amendment. Neither the District Court nor the Tenth Circuit
considered whether the amendment is severable,13 but the parties have now
joined issue on that point. On the one hand, the “Sharia Law” law
provisions appear to have been central to the adoption of the amendment.
On the other hand, the remaining portions of the amendment can operate
without those references, with the possible exception of the reference to
“other . . . cultures.”14 Whether the District Court certifies the issue of
severability to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, or whether it conducts that
analysis on its own,15 there is at least a fair chance that portions of the
amendment ultimately will go into effect. Those provisions will raise a
host of questions, some of them difficult, that could take years to work their
way through the Oklahoma judicial system.
11. E.g., Aaron Fellmuth, U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International and
Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 107 (2012); John T. Parry, International Law in State
Courts: Sovereignty, Resistance, Contagion, and Inevitability, WILL. J. INT’L L & DISPUTE
RES. (forthcoming 2013).
12. Symeon Symeonides and Penny Venetis also approach the amendment from a
conflict of laws perspective, but they focus on the constitutional issues that this perspective
raises. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010:
Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 320-21 (2011); Penny M. Venetis,
The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and Other Provisions Like It, Which Bar
State Courts from Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189 (2011). This
essay addresses some of those issues but also considers specific issues of choice of law
doctrine.
13. The Tenth Circuit noted the severability issue but did not address it. See Awad v.
Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 n.16 (10th Cir. 2012).
14. See Parry, supra note 10, at 164. For the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of “other . . .
cultures,” see Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129. For an overview of Oklahoma law on severability
and an assessment of how severability analysis applies to the Save Our State Amendment,
see Parry, supra note 10, at 163-65.
15. See Parry, supra note 10, at 165-66 (advocating certification).
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A further reason for this essay’s approach to the amendment is that,
whether or not it ever goes into effect, it is a useful vehicle for teaching and
thinking about at least three sets of issues: (1) the many conflict of laws
doctrines that the amendment implicates, (2) the ways in which methods of
statutory interpretation apply to voter initiatives and referenda, and (3) the
unintended consequences of bad drafting and ideological motivations.
The first section of this essay addresses the scope of the amendment—
the entities to and the situations in which it applies. The second section
considers the amendment’s impact on Oklahoma choice of law doctrine and
Oklahoma jurisprudence more generally through its list of approved and
forbidden legal sources for Oklahoma courts. By extension, this section
also addresses the amendment’s impact on federal district courts hearing
diversity cases in which Oklahoma law applies. The final section is a brief
conclusion that contemplates the larger impact of the issues that this essay
identifies.
This essay does not claim to have identified or fully addressed every
issue that the amendment raises or every problem that it creates and largely
leaves discussion of the religion clauses to the federal courts and other
writers. Hopefully, this essay says enough to convince even those who
support the amendment’s political goals that it is poorly drafted and creates
more problems than it purports to solve.
I. The Scope of the Save Our State Amendment
A. To What Entities Does the Amendment Apply?
The Save Our State Amendment adds subsection C to section 1 of
Article 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution and its provisions apply to “[t]he
Courts provided for in subsection A of this section.” Subsection A, in turn,
provides a list of the entities that are entitled to exercise “[t]he judicial
power of this State”:
the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, a Supreme Court,
the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court on the Judiciary, the
Workers’ Compensation Court, the Court of Bank Review, the
Court of Tax Review, and such intermediate appellate courts as
may be provided by statute, District Courts, and such Boards,
Agencies and Commissions created by the Constitution or
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established by statute as exercise adjudicative authority or render
decisions in individual proceedings.16
Note that this list includes courts but also includes “Boards, Agencies
and Commissions.” That is to say, a textual distinction exists between, on
the one hand, the “courts” of Oklahoma and, on the other hand, the
“Boards, Agencies and Commissions” of Oklahoma, which also exercise
the judicial power of the state when they “exercise adjudicative authority or
render decisions in individual proceedings.”
Read literally, new subsection C applies only to the courts, and not to
these other entities that exercise judicial power. Of course, one easily could
argue that the purpose of subsection C is to redefine the scope of judicial
power and that any entity that applies judicial power—that is, anything that,
in the words of subsection A, “exercise[s] adjudicative authority or
render[s] decisions in individual proceedings”—is a “court,” regardless of
that entity’s formal title. The issue of how this language should be
interpreted will have to be resolved by Oklahoma courts and commentators
in the future, but, at least initially, it is unclear whether subsection C applies
to all entities that exercise the judicial power of Oklahoma or only to those
with the formal title of “court.”
Nor is this the only uncertainty about the amendment’s scope.
Subsection A also refers to “Municipal Courts in cities or incorporated
towns,” and it provides that they
shall continue in effect and shall be subject to creation, abolition
or alteration by the Legislature by general laws, but shall be
limited in jurisdiction to criminal and traffic proceedings arising
out of infractions of the provisions of ordinances of cities and
towns or of duly adopted regulations authorized by such
ordinances.17
In light of their limited jurisdiction—especially including the fact that
they do not apply state law—are municipal courts properly included in
subsection C’s list of “[t]he courts provided for in subsection A”?
One might argue that subsection A merely recognizes these courts but
does not “provide” for them. But there are good textual and structural
arguments to the contrary. Before 1967, section 1 of Article VII included
municipal courts in the list of entities that exercise the judicial power of the

16. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
17. Id.
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state18—which suggests that it is fair to conclude that the earlier version of
subsection A “provided for” municipal courts in the sense that subsection C
uses the phrase. A 1967 amendment established the current text of
subsection A, which states that municipal courts shall “continue in effect.”
Perhaps this is enough to show that subsection A also “provides for”
municipal courts and that they are therefore subject to the restrictions of the
amendment.
There are at least two responses to this argument. First, before 1967,
municipal courts could exercise the judicial power of Oklahoma, but the
text of subsection A indicates that they no longer do so and instead exercise
only municipal power, with the result that they belong in an entirely
different category. Of course, one might point out in rebuttal that
municipalities are mere creatures of the state—and subsection A
demonstrates this by allowing municipal courts to “continue in effect”—
such that any exercise of municipal power is necessarily an exercise of state
power.19 From there, one might draw the conclusion that applying
municipal ordinances and regulations is ultimately the same thing as
adjudicating questions of state law.
The second argument asserts that municipal courts cannot be included in
the list of courts “provided for by subsection A,” because such a result
would put subsection A and subsection C in contradiction. Subsection C
does not include municipal ordinances and regulations in the category of
laws that “[t]he Courts provided for in subsection A” may apply, while
subsection A does not allow municipal courts to apply anything other than
municipal ordinances and regulations. It may be that municipal law is
ultimately a creature of state law, but the Oklahoma constitution appears to
draw a meaningful distinction between the two, and this distinction limits
the scope of subsection C. If this last argument is correct, then municipal
courts fall outside the amendment, which means that, among other things,
they may “look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures” and
“consider international law and Sharia Law” in the extremely unlikely event

18. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1951) (repealed 1967).
19. See Office of the Attorney General of the State of Okla., Attorney General Opinion
No. 04-22, § 2 (2004) (“Under the legal principle known as ‘Dillon’s Rule,’ a county or
municipality possesses and can exercise only those powers granted by the State in express
words, or those necessarily or fairly implied or incidental to the powers expressly granted
and essential to the declared objects and purposes of the public entity.”) (citing Morland
Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 596 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Okla. 1979) (Barnes, J., concurring);
Dev. Indus, Inc. v. City of Norman, 412 P.2d 953, 956 (Okla. 1966)).
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that those sources could help them resolve “criminal and traffic
proceedings” under municipal ordinances and regulations.
B. When Does the Save Our State Amendment Apply?
The amendment states that it applies when “[t]he Courts provided for in
subsection A” are “exercising their judicial authority,” “making judicial
decisions,” and in “all cases before the respective courts including, but not
limited to, cases of first impression.” One of these phrases comes at the
beginning of the amendment, another in the middle, and the third at the end.
Based on the assumption that it is appropriate to interpret the various parts
of the amendment to produce a harmonious whole, one could read these
three phrases together rather than as separate concepts. If that is the correct
approach, and subject to the ambiguities about “courts” that I addressed in
the previous section, the amendment applies when courts are “exercising
their judicial authority and making judicial decisions in all cases before
[them].”
Oklahoma case law does not provide a great deal of insight into the
definition of “judicial authority” beyond distinguishing it from political
authority and stating that it is the power of a court to decide cases over
which it has jurisdiction.20 In addition, Oklahoma has adopted the bulk of
federal case-or-controversy doctrine (despite the absence of any such
language in the state constitution).21 In short, the best interpretation of
“judicial authority” in Oklahoma is probably the power to resolve cases or
controversies. If that is true, then weaving these three phrases together
makes sense.

20. McAlister v. State, 221 P. 779, 782-83 (Okla. 1923) (distinguished from politics);
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Higgins, 137 P.2d 273, 280 (Okla. Crim. App. 1943).
21. See Stasha D. McBride, Note, Time to Stand Back: Unnecessary Gate-Keeping to
Oklahoma Courts, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 177 (2003). Oklahoma case or controversy doctrine
includes a rule against advisory opinions. See Dank v. Benson, 5 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Okla.
2000). Oklahoma does have a rarely-used advisory opinion statute that allows the Governor
to “require the opinion of the Judges of the Criminal Court of Appeals, or any of them,”
concerning a case in which a death sentence has been imposed. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1003
(2011). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held that these advisory opinions are
available
when an appeal has not been taken in a capital case from a judgment and
sentence of death. The sole proposition then presented would be: Has there
been an observance of all the formalities of law essential to the taking of human
life, and has the trial, conviction and sentence of death been in accordance with
the law of the land?
Opinion of the Judges v. Gould, 197 P.2d 629, 634 (Okla. Crim. App. 1948).
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Some commentators have suggested that the amendment raises serious
full faith and credit concerns because it could prevent the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in other states under certain circumstances.22
Because this issue overlaps with the question of when the amendment
applies, it merits consideration here, beginning with the extent to which the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Oklahoma require the
exercise of “judicial authority.”
The Oklahoma legislature has adopted the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”), which governs the manner in which the
judgments of courts in other states become enforceable in Oklahoma.23
Although a party retains the option of filing an action in court to obtain
recognition of an out-of-state judgment,24 the ordinary process for obtaining
recognition of foreign judgments is essentially a clerical task: the party
seeking recognition simply files an authenticated copy of the out-of-state
judgment with the clerk of the court.25 At this stage, no judges are
involved, and there is no case or controversy over which a court would
exercise “judicial authority.” Thus, the Save Our State Amendment has no
impact on this process. Out-of-state judgments—even judgments that rely
on “international law or Sharia Law” or on the laws of “other nations or
cultures”—are entitled to recognition under the non-judicial process
established by Oklahoma law (although the amendment will apply if a party
chooses to seek recognition of a judgment by filing an action in court).
Of course, judicial proceedings may take place when a party seeks not
just recognition but also enforcement of an out-of-state judgment.
Typically, the kinds of judicial proceedings that arise are motions to stay
enforcement pending appeal,26 challenges to the validity of the judgment on
the few grounds allowed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and further
proceedings to enforce the judgment. As to the last type of proceeding,
Oklahoma law follows the UEFJA and states, “A judgment so filed has the
same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district
court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.”27

22. See Symeonides, supra note 12, at 322 (noting that it is not clear whether the
amendment applies to judgments); Venetis, supra note 12, at 206-07, 209-10.
23. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 719-726 (2011).
24. Id. § 725.
25. See id. §§ 721, 722.
26. See id. § 723.
27. See id. § 721.
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Further, Oklahoma courts have made clear that they do not review the
correctness of the foreign judgment.28
This last point brings in the issue of whether the amendment seeks to
change Oklahoma jurisprudence and require Oklahoma courts to look
behind out-of-state judgments when overseeing enforcement of that
judgment. Arguably, enforcing an out-of-state judgment will result in
“upholding” the law of that state. If that judgment is based on one of the
sources of law that the amendment proscribes, then the amendment would
prevent enforcement. Further, if a party was successful at reopening such a
judgment, then the amendment would also apply. But all of this is
ultimately beside the point, because if the amendment were to have the
effects outlined above, then it would almost certainly conflict with and be
overridden by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Supreme Court has
held that there is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and
credit due judgments.”29 Dislike of another state’s law or policies is not a
basis for refusing to recognize a judgment.
With respect to judgments of the courts of other countries, the Oklahoma
legislature has adopted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act (“UFCMJRA”).30 In contrast to the clerical process for
recognizing judgments of other states, Oklahoma follows the UFCMJRA
procedures requiring the party seeking recognition of a foreign judgment to
file an action in court.31 Again following the UFCMJRA, Oklahoma law
specifically provides that a court “need not recognize a foreign-country
judgment if . . . the judgment or the cause of action on which the judgment
is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United
States.”32
28. Crockett v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 789 P.2d 1 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990); Aetna
Finance Co. v. Bowler, 622 P.2d 292 (Okla. Civ. App. 1980).
29. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); see also id. at 234 (“We are
‘aware of [no] considerations of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair
the force and effect which the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress require to
be given to [a money] judgment outside the state of its rendition.’”) (quoting Magnolia
Petroleum v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943)); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
Note that equitable decrees are also entitled to full faith and credit with respect to their
preclusive effects, although state courts have some leeway in enforcing them. See Baker,
522 U.S. at 234-36. The judgments of federal courts are also entitled to full faith and credit.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
30. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 718.1-718.12.
31. See id. § 718.6.
32. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 718.4(c)(3). The National Commissioners on Uniform Laws
added the following comment to this subsection:
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Oklahoma courts presumably would conclude that the Save Our State
Amendment declares the public policy of Oklahoma. Thus, Oklahoma
courts would probably apply the amendment to cases seeking recognition of
foreign country judgments.33 Under a straightforward textual reading, the
amendment appears to ban recognition of judgments rendered by the courts
of other countries if those judgments also rely on the law of another country
(or on one of the other proscribed sources of law).
There is no specific federal constitutional provision, federal statute, or
international convention that would override this portion of the
amendment.34 The background approach to recognition of foreign country
judgments is comity, with a general view that foreign judgments deserve
recognition but also with some disagreement about the circumstances in
which it is appropriate to refuse recognition.35 Oklahoma is therefore
generally free to adopt its own views, as it has done. Note, however, that

Although subsection 4(c)(3) of this Act rejects the narrow focus on the cause of
action under the 1962 Act, it retains the stringent test for finding a public policy
violation applied by courts interpreting the 1962 Act. Under that test, a
difference in law, even a marked one, is not sufficient to raise a public policy
issue. Nor is it relevant that the foreign law allows a recovery that the forum
state would not allow. Public policy is violated only if recognition or
enforcement of the foreign-country judgment would tend clearly to injure the
public health, the public morals, or the public confidence in the administration
of law, or would undermine “that sense of security for individual rights,
whether if personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to
feel.
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, cmt. 8 ¶ 2 (Elec. Part
Supp. 2011) (quoting Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D.
Tex. 1980)). If the Oklahoma legislature intended this comment to control Oklahoma
courts’ application of the Uniform Act, that unexpressed legislative intention is vulnerable to
plain meaning/textualist arguments about the meaning of “public policy.” In any event, the
constitutional language of the amendment presumably overrides the unexpressed legislative
intent.
33. Presumably, the amendment would also trump the statutory requirement that, “[i]n
applying and construing the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act,
consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its
subject matter among states that enact it.” 12 OKLA. STAT. § 718.10.
34. From time to time, the federal government has considered entering into treaties or
conventions for the recognition of foreign country judgments but those efforts have failed to
date. See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1504-08 (5th ed. 2010).
35. For comity, see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). For the trend toward
recognition and possible reasons for withholding recognition, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 481-482 (1986); HAY ET AL., supra note 34, at 1491-96.
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the broad textual reading advanced above is not the only possible reading of
the amendment. Oklahoma courts could adopt a different reading that
partially reconciles the amendment with the general trend in favor of
recognition. This narrower interpretation would only prevent recognition of
foreign country judgments that are based on foreign country law if the rule
of decision conflicts with the rule that would be applied under Oklahoma
law. This narrower interpretation would also allow Oklahoma courts to
lessen the potential foreign relations impact (and possible federal
preemption) of a blanket ban on enforcement.36
With respect to arbitrations, Oklahoma has adopted the Uniform
Arbitration Act, which provides that arbitration awards must be confirmed
and reduced to judgment by a district court of the state.37 The same is true
under the Federal Arbitration Act.38 Neither statute contains any provision
that allows courts to consider public policy as a ground for refusing to
confirm an award.39 Thus, if the amendment applies to cases in which a
party asks an Oklahoma court to confirm a judgment, it does so only though
an implied amendment to the state statute. And if it does apply, then
Oklahoma courts would have to determine whether the arbitrator
impermissibly applied a forbidden source of law. But the amendment does
not apply to the effort to obtain recognition of an out-of-state judgment that
itself confirmed an arbitration award and reduced it to judgment. Such an
award falls generally within the above discussion of state judgments,
including the discussion of full faith and credit.40
For foreign arbitrations, federal law provides that any awards that fall
within the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

36. For discussion of foreign affairs preemption, see infra notes 103, 126 and
accompanying text.
37. See 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1873, 1876 (Supp. 2012).
38. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (2012).
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1874. Federal courts have developed
doctrines that permit vacatur of an arbitration award in some circumstances, including public
policy, but the scope and propriety of these doctrines is unclear. See Sean C. Wagner, Note,
Unchecked: How Frazier v. CitiFinancial Eliminated Judicially Created Grounds for
Vacatur Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 235 (2012). In any event, it
seems unlikely that a court acting under the Federal Arbitration Act would vacate an
arbitration award on public policy grounds as inconsistent with the Save Our State
Amendment. Cf. Nitro-Lift Technologies v. Howard, No. 11-1377, slip op. (U.S. Nov. 26,
2012) (per curiam), available at 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897 (holding the Federal Arbitration Act
prevented Oklahoma courts from using state law on enforcement of non-compete
agreements to review the validity of a contract that contained an arbitration clause).
40. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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Arbitral Awards are entitled to confirmation and enforcement by state and
federal courts.41 Thus, federal law specifically requires Oklahoma courts to
apply the standards of the Convention, even though the Convention is an
example of international law.42 With respect to recognition, the Convention
provides that courts can refuse to recognize and enforce an award that is
“contrary to the public policy of that country.”43 But this public policy
exception does not make room for the Save Our State Amendment, because
that amendment states the public policy only of Oklahoma, not of the
United States. Thus, Oklahoma courts are bound by federal law to
recognize foreign arbitral awards, even if those awards are based in legal
sources that the amendment purports to ban from Oklahoma courts.44
II. The Save Our State Amendment as a Choice of Law Catalogue
The Save Our State Amendment contains two lists of laws. The first is
the approved sources of law for Oklahoma courts, and the second is the
sources that Oklahoma courts “shall not look to” or “consider.”45 This
section considers the items on these lists, beginning with the approved
sources. It also assesses the impact of these lists on federal courts that
apply Oklahoma law in diversity cases.
A. Approved Sources of Law
The amendment provides that Oklahoma courts
shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United
States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United
States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto,
established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of
41. See 9 U.S.C. § 207. Federal law provides that, to the extent consistent, the Federal
Arbitration Act also applies to foreign awards. See id. § 208.
42. The federal statute makes it unnecessary to consider any Supremacy Clause
argument with respect to the Convention itself. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
43. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V,
§ 2(b) (June 10, 1958)), 21 U.S.T. 2517. Note that if Oklahoma courts refused to apply the
standards of the Convention, they would have to decide whether to fall back on existing
federal and state standards for domestic arbitrations, which do not include public policy
exceptions.
44. Still, anyone seeking to uphold the validity of a foreign arbitral award in Oklahoma
would be well advised to file in federal court or remove the case to federal court. See 9
U.S.C. §§ 203, 205.
45. Save Our State Amendment, supra note 1.
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another state of the United States provided the law of the other
state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions.46
The inclusion and description of several of these sources—the two
constitutions, the U.S. Code, and Oklahoma statutes—are uncontroversial.
The way in which the amendment describes the other sources of law,
however, raises some questions.
1. Federal Regulations
The amendment refers to “federal regulations promulgated pursuant” to
the U.S. Code.47 Read in one way, this is also an uncontroversial phrase.
Federal regulations have preemptive force under the supremacy clause and
state courts must apply them so long as they are valid regulations.48 Federal
regulations that stray beyond the authority of the agency, however, are
invalid—for example, if they are in some sense not “promulgated pursuant”
to the authorizing statutes—and neither federal nor state courts should
apply them.49 Further, in the event that an Oklahoma court confronts a
federal regulation, it is entitled to assess the validity of that regulation
(unless the relevant federal statute provides federal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over challenges to the regulation).
But this part of the amendment arguably conveys a slightly different
message, to the effect that it is the independent duty of Oklahoma courts to
assess the validity of federal regulations and to make sure that federal
agencies are staying within their proper bounds. Read in this second way,
this language gives the sense of challenging or at least seeking to define
federal authority. It is also a specific example of the overall tone of the
amendment, a tone that suggests a formal and restrictive idea of federal
authority and of judicial authority, whether state or federal.
Whether or not this is a correct understanding of the tone of the
amendment, its ultimate impact is more political than doctrinal. At least as
a formal matter, Oklahoma voters, legislators, and courts can use whatever
tone they wish when talking about federal law, but they lack the power to
alter the doctrinal test for the validity of federal regulations. Although
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. E.g., Fid. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (“Federal
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. . . . A preemptive
regulation’s force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state
law . . . .”); see also City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988).
49. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984) (discussing the standards for federal court review of agency regulations).
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Oklahoma courts have independent power to apply that test, they are bound
by the supremacy clause to apply and give preemptive effect to all federal
regulations that are valid under federal doctrine. A state court cannot, for
example, depart from the Chevron doctrine when assessing the validity of a
federal regulation, even if it would use a different test to assess the validity
of state regulations. Further, once the U.S. Supreme Court has determined
the scope of a federal regulation, Oklahoma courts must follow that
ruling.50
Could Oklahoma courts apply these federal doctrinal tests grudgingly or
in bad faith? Of course they could, but that is true of any court. Can a state
constitution instruct state courts to interpret federal doctrine grudgingly or
in bad faith? Here, again, the answer is yes as a formal matter. Federal
courts cannot strike that language out of a state constitution. But, the fact
remains that under preemption doctrine, such language can have no proper
force.
2. Established Common Law
The amendment includes an unadorned reference to “established
common law.”51 This is the only one of the approved sources of law that is
not designated as specifically state or federal. This lack of specificity raises
at least three interpretive issues.
The first issue is whether the term “common law” means Oklahoma
common law, or whether it refers instead to the general common law in
roughly the sense that the Supreme Court used it in Swift v. Tyson?52
Michael Green has recently asserted that “Georgia state courts still conceive
of the common law in Swiftian terms.”53 Perhaps the same is true in
Oklahoma.
The drafters of the amendment may have used the phrase “established
common law” to reflect the language of the Oklahoma reception statute,
enacted in 1910, which carries the title “Force of Common Law” and
provides,
The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory
law, judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people,
shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma;
50. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (discussing this issue in the context of
constitutional litigation over school desegregation).
51. Save Our State Amendment, supra note 1.
52. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
53. Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1126
(2011).
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but the rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation
thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any
general statute of Oklahoma; but all such statutes shall be
liberally construed to promote their object.54
This statute’s use of “[t]he common law”—which is similar to the
language of reception statutes from the Swift era and earlier—suggests that
the common law in Oklahoma was once the general common law. It does
not settle, however, the questions whether the statute’s use of “the common
law” reflects a deeper, and fixed, jurisprudential stance, or whether
“established common law” in the Save Our State Amendment is merely a
matter of phrasing or instead confirms the meaning of the statute, whatever
that may be.
For its part, the Oklahoma Supreme Court frequently refers to
“Oklahoma’s common law,”55 which suggests a more positivist conception
of the common law as something bound up in Oklahoma’s status as a
sovereign, law-dispensing state. Earlier in the twentieth century, however,
the court sometimes used phrases such as “the general common law.”56
Then, in its 1980 decision in McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing
Company, the court said the following:
Although there was no distinctive tort of invasion of privacy in
early common law, it has evolved in most jurisdictions based on
common law principles sometimes compared to trespass. It is
unnecessary for the Legislature to enact a law to create this tort
in abrogation of the common law. The common law, followed in
Oklahoma, refers not only to the ancient unwritten law of
England, but also to that body of law created and preserved by
decisions of courts.57

54. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (Supp. 2012).
55. E.g., Kruchowski v. The Weyerhaeuser Co., 202 P.3d 144, 148 n.8 (Okla. 2008);
Bittle v. Bahe, 192 P.3d 810, 815 (Okla. 2008); Lierly v. Tidewater Petroleum Corp., 139
P.3d 897, 905 n.8 (Okla. 2006); Delk v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 81 P.3d 629, 633 (Okla.
2003); Camps v. Taylor, 892 P.2d 633, 635 (Okla. 1995); see also Pribram v. Fouts, 736
P.2d 513, 515 (Okla. 1987) (“the common law of Oklahoma”).
56. See Merveldt & Son v. Biggs, 147 P.2d 146, 148 (Okla. 1944) (discussing a
garnishment statute and stating that it “is a declaration of the general or common law as it
exists in the absence of specific statutory provision”); McGee v. Kirby, 118 P.2d 199, 201
(Okla. 1941) (distinguishing between “the general common law” and “our general statutes”).
57. McCormack v. Okla. Pub. Co., 613 P.2d 737, 739 (Okla. 1980).
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Most recently, Justice Marian Opala repeatedly and perhaps
idiosyncratically insisted that Oklahoma courts apply something broader
than a specifically Oklahoma common law: “The common law is drawn
from three sources—the common law of England, of other states and of
Oklahoma.”58
In short, there is some support for the idea that, in Oklahoma, the
common law has a close relationship to the general common law. Does the
amendment constitutionalize this view? Perhaps one could reasonably
conclude that the language of the amendment comes closer to Justice
Opala’s views or the views that the court expressed in McCormack than it
does to a more positivist view. But turning this conclusion into doctrine is
another thing altogether. An Oklahoma judge might easily conclude that
the amendment is not specific enough to change the nature of the common
law in Oklahoma, whatever that may be.
The second issue is the doctrinal impact of the word “established,”
especially when combined with the last sentence of the amendment, which
states that its provisions apply to all cases, “including . . . cases of first
impression.”59 The Oklahoma reception statute declares that the common

58. Gomes v. Hameed, 184 P.3d 479, 494 n.14 (Okla. 2008) (Opala, J., dissenting).
Justice Opala went on to say,
Had the norm chosen for today’s adoption been one of English common law,
which lawyers are presumed to know, it could have been implanted without
added study. When we are dealing with a norm of common law in the state, its
pre-existence (existence antecedent to today’s pronouncement) could be
established either by extant state jurisprudence or, in its absence, by expert
testimonial proof of the norm’s general acceptance in the state by longestablished and widespread use. But if the rule to be adopted today is one of
American common law but found neither in Oklahoma jurisprudence nor in the
common law of England, litigants and their lawyers should not be bound to
notice its existence sans proof.
Id. at 493-94; see also Watson v. Gibson Capital, 187 P.3d 735, 740 (Okla. 2008) (“Our
pronouncement restates the centuries-old rules of legal practice embodied in Oklahoma’s
common law that stands unaltered by statute.”); McGehee v. Arvest Trust Co. (In re Estate
of Bleeker), 168 P.3d 774, 781 (Okla. 2007) (“The common law, which stands legislatively
declared to be a constituent part of this State's body of law, need not be drawn exclusively
from English precedent, but may also be fashioned by utilizing other sources, including legal
norms taken from common-law jurisprudence of sister states.”); Camps v. Taylor, 892 P.2d
633, 636 (Okla. 1995) (Opala, J., concurring) (“Because the unwritten component of
Oklahoma’s legal tradition retains its efficacy and vigor with undiminished force . . . the
general common law must be universally enforced unless a different construction is
mandated by a governing statute.”).
59. Save Our State Amendment, supra note 1.
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law can be “modified by . . . the condition and wants of the people.”60 In
McCormack, the Oklahoma Supreme Court made clear that courts are not
limited to applying existing law: “The common law is not static, but is a
dynamic and growing thing and its rules arise from the application of
reason to the changing conditions of society. Flexibility and capacity for
growth and adaptation is its peculiar boast and excellence.”61 For his part,
Justice Opala also stated that the common law can and should change over
time and he referred to the American Law Institute’s Restatements as an
example of how to “carefully and deliberatively monitor and track the
development and growth of American common law.”62 All of this indicates
that the common law in Oklahoma has not existed only as a body of
relatively fixed rules but has also remained open to change in response to
circumstances and the broader currents of American law.
The Save Our State Amendment arguably overrides the reception statute
and the Oklahoma jurisprudence that I have cited by requiring the
application of “established common law . . . [i]n cases of first impression.”
The insistence on “established” law suggests a distrust of judges’ efforts to
grow, adapt, or develop the common law, presumably because the exercise
of discretion to shape the law risks being a license for “judicial activism”—
and the scare quotes indicate that this term tends to be as much or more a
slogan than a demonstrable phenomenon. Here again, the amendment is
more significant for its tone than for its doctrinal impact. Perhaps one can
interpret the text of the amendment to freeze the common law in Oklahoma
as of November 2010. But judges easily could, and probably would, avoid
the potential strictures of this provision by simply declaring—as common
law courts frequently do—that they are not making new law but are merely
applying existing common law principles to new facts. One would expect,
in turn, that judges who dissented from such rulings would use the language
of the amendment to bolster their own arguments in the other direction.63

60. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (Supp. 2012).
61. McCormack, 613 P.2d at 739.
62. Gomes, 184 P.3d at 491 (Opala, J., dissenting); see also Bouziden v. Alfalfa Elec.
Coop., Inc., 16 P.3d 450, 464 (Okla. 2000) (Opala, J., dissenting); Greenberg v. Wolfberg,
890 P.2d 895, 901 (Okla. 1994) (appearing to describe the Restatements as “the national
body of common law”).
63. The potential parallels on this issue between the Save Our State Amendment and the
nineteenth century “codification movement” are worth exploring but are also beyond the
scope of this essay. For a useful and short introduction to the idea and study of codification,
see Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 36 VAND. L. REV. 431 (1983) (reviewing Charles M.
Cook, The American Codification Movement, A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform (1981)).
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The third issue is whether “established common law” includes federal
common law. If this language is simply a broad reference to the validity of
common law rules, then it could include federal common law. If the point
is to refer only to Oklahoma common law, then it would exclude federal
law. And if this language refers to the general common law in the Swift v.
Tyson sense, then the answer is less clear, although the Supreme Court has
made clear that although federal common law exists, “there is no federal
general common law.”64
Whatever the meaning of the amendment on this point, Oklahoma courts
remain bound by the supremacy clause to apply federal common law and to
give it preemptive force over state law.65 That is to say, one could interpret
“established common law” to include federal common law and thereby
avoid the constitutional question or one could interpret it to exclude federal
common law and then declare that the supremacy clause overrides this
effort at exclusion.
3. The Law of Other States, “If Necessary”
The amendment further provides that, “if necessary,” Oklahoma courts
must also “uphold and adhere to . . . the law of another state of the United
States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law.”66
As was true for the other provisions of the amendment, this one also raises
a host of issues. This section focuses on the most basic issue: when is it
“necessary” to apply the law of another state? There is little Oklahoma
case law on the meaning of “necessary,”67 but there are several options for
interpreting this part of the amendment, depending on whether “if
necessary” comes closer to meaning something like “indispensable” or
“absolutely necessary,” or whether it means something more like
“convenient” or “appropriate.”68
64. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
65. E.g., Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
66. Save Our State Amendment, supra note 1.
67. Cf. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. State, 645 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Okla. 1982) (discussing
the meaning of “necessary” in an Oklahoma constitutional provision relating to the powers
and duties of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission).
68. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819) (holding the word
“necessary” in the federal Constitution’s necessary and proper clause is essentially
synonymous with the exercise of discretion and good judgment). Note, however, that Chief
Justice Marshall justified this interpretation in part because the question was the scope of
one of the enumerated powers of Congress, and he stated that Congress needed flexibility to
confront “the various crises of human affairs.” Id. at 415. One could easily argue that the
issues implicated by this aspect of the Save Our State Amendment do not rise to this level.
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First, as a matter of federal full faith and credit and due process doctrine,
it is necessary for Oklahoma courts to apply the law of another state when
Oklahoma has no legitimate interest in applying its law to a case over
which its courts have jurisdiction and which they intend to decide.69
Whatever else “if necessary” means, it must mean at least this much. But
the due process requirement of “state interests” is not a very powerful
constraint.70 The upshot is that, if the amendment goes into effect,
Oklahoma courts will rarely have to apply the law of another state if due
process defines the full scope of “if necessary.”
The issue would get a bit more complicated if the “Sharia Law”
provision were enforceable.71 Consider a situation in which Oklahoma had
no interest, but in which one party argued that Oklahoma courts could not
apply the law of the state or states that had legitimate interests, because the
law of every such state included “Sharia Law.” Would the “Sharia Law”
portions of the amendment have required Oklahoma courts to apply
Oklahoma law in such a case, or could they simply have dismissed the
case—perhaps for lack of jurisdiction or on forum non conveniens
grounds—and thereby allow the plaintiff to refile in a jurisdiction that
would apply the appropriate law?72 What does it mean for the law of
another state to “include Sharia Law”? The amendment seems easily to
apply to a circumstance (a circumstance that may be a null set) in which the
laws of another U.S. state incorporate “Sharia Law” as the rule of decision.
It is possible—although perhaps not likely—that a court would have
interpreted the amendment as a rule of contagion, such that the law of any
69. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(“For a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that
State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that its choice of law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”).
70. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-23 (1985) (summarizing the
agreement of the justices in Allstate that “the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause provided modest restrictions on the application of forum law” but also
overturning the Kansas Supreme Court’s application of Kansas law to the claims of
thousands of class action plaintiffs who had no connection to Kansas).
71. I put quotation marks around “Sharia Law” simply to indicate that it is a term of art
within the amendment and does not correspond to typical understandings of Islamic law.
See infra note 135 and accompanying text; Parry, supra note 10, at 167-68.
72. The question then would be whether such a dismissal would run afoul of the limited
obligation to provide a forum. See Hughes v. Vetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). On the one hand,
the refusal to apply another state’s law would plainly be discriminatory based in antipathy to
the “Sharia Law” that is part of that state’s law. On the other hand, if the case could be
brought elsewhere and the litigants had little connection to Oklahoma, then it is not clear that
Hughes would apply. See id. at 613.
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state that includes even a single rule drawn from “Sharia Law” would have
been automatically off limits for Oklahoma courts, whether or not that rule
had any application to the case at hand. Also unclear is whether the
amendment would have applied when the courts of a state allowed parties
to select or refer to “Sharia Law” in a contract or will.
Had the “Sharia Law” provision survived the federal litigation,
Oklahoma courts might have opted for the narrower view that the
amendment barred application of another state’s law only if the law that
might or would be applied included rules drawn from “Sharia Law.”73 But
what if, in the hypothetical, Oklahoma courts had determined, first, that
they could not apply the law of another state because of some concern
about “Sharia Law,” and, second, that the amendment required them to
apply Oklahoma law (rather than dismiss the case) even without any
legitimate state interest? The answer is that the amendment would be
unconstitutional as applied to such a case because due process doctrine
would require Oklahoma courts to apply the law of the other state (or at
least to dismiss so that the case could be refiled in another forum).74
The remaining definitions of “if necessary” would allow Oklahoma
courts to apply the law of other states in circumstances that go beyond the
federal constitutional mandate. Thus, a second and somewhat broader
definition would allow Oklahoma courts to apply the law of another state if
an Oklahoma statute requires Oklahoma courts to apply the law of that
state. For example, Oklahoma has adopted several choice of law statutes
relating to commercial transactions. The general choice of law statute for
contracts provides, “A contract is to be interpreted according to the law and
usage of the place where it is to be performed, or, if it does not indicate a
place of performance, according to the law and usage of the place where it
is made.”75 Oklahoma has also adopted the Uniform Commercial Code
73. It is perhaps worth noting that one scholar has argued that some of the fundamental
qualities of English common law are drawn from Islamic law and practice. See John A.
Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of the Common Law, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1635 (1999). If
Makdisi’s arguments are correct, and if Oklahoma courts would have read the amendment to
bar the application of any law from a state if any part of that state’s law includes Islamic
law, then there would also have been an interesting argument that Oklahoma courts would
never be able to apply the common law of another state.
74. Some proposals in other states “provide that state courts may not dismiss a case on
the ground of forum non conveniens if it appears likely that another court would take action
violating the state or federal constitutional rights of a state citizen.” Fellmuth, supra note 11,
at 116. Exactly what these provisions mean, or how they would be applied, is a mystery.
See id. at 116-17 (discussing reasons why these provisions are “odd”).
75. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (Supp. 2012).
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(“UCC”) which explicitly states that, “[e]xcept as provided hereafter in this
section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also
to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.”76
Other provisions of the UCC that have been incorporated into Oklahoma
law also provide specific choice of law rules.77
In addition, the state has adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act, which provides that the law of the state that issues a support decree
will govern most issues relating to enforcement of that decree.78 More
obliquely, Oklahoma’s uninsured motorist statute applies only to policies
“issued, delivered, renewed, or extended in this state with respect to a
motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state.”79 According
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the law of another state must govern cases
that involve policies that do not fall within the terms of the statute.80
Extending the definition of “if necessary” to include compliance with these
various statutes would avoid needless disruption of Oklahoma law.81
Third, Oklahoma courts could rule that it is also necessary to apply the
law of another state if the parties contracted to apply the law of that other
state.
This principle of party autonomy is widely recognized in
contemporary choice of law doctrine, and Oklahoma law provides at least
some room for it.82
76. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-301(a) (Supp. 2012).
77. See id. § 1-301(b) (2011) (listing provisions of the UCC that are applicable in
Oklahoma and that govern choice of law in specific situations).
78. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 601-604. In addition, a federal statute requires states to adopt the
UIFSA as a condition to receiving federal funding for child support enforcement. See
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), Pub. L.
104-193, § 321, 110 Stat. 2105, 2221 (1996). Were the amendment to override the ability of
Oklahoma courts to comply with the UIFSA, it is at least conceivable that the state’s
continued eligibility for such funding would be in doubt.
79. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 3636(a) (2011).
80. Bernal v. Charter Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 209 P.3d 309, 316 (Okla. 2009). Oklahoma
also has a borrowing statute that would be overridden if the amendment does not allow
choice of law statutes to create the requisite necessity to apply the law of another state. See
12 OKLA. STAT. § 105 (2011) (“The period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing
outside of this state shall be that prescribed either by the law of the place where the claim
accrued or by the law of this state, whichever last bars the claim.”).
81. The rest of this section omits further discussion of the impact of the nowunenforceable “Sharia Law” provision.
82. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-301 (2011) (allowing party choice of law in many
transactions governed by the UCC); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 796 P.2d 296, 29899 (Okla. 1990) (stating in dicta that the permissive standards of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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Fourth, and broadest, Oklahoma courts could hold that it is also
necessary to apply the law of another state when the application of
Oklahoma choice of law jurisprudence indicates that the law of that other
state is most appropriate for a particular case. Interpreting “if necessary” to
include these cases requires some looseness but it also does the least
damage to existing Oklahoma choice of law doctrine. Of course, one could
argue that the point of the amendment was to change Oklahoma choice of
law doctrine—but except for concerns about “Sharia Law” and
international law—it is not clear why the drafters of the amendment or the
voters would have wanted to effect sweeping changes in this area of law.83
It would be easier to reach such a conclusion if the amendment purported
to establish a method for choice of law. But it does not. Thus, Oklahoma
courts must either look to established choice of law doctrine or create new
rules to determine when it might be necessary to choose the law of another
state. And unless they flatly hold that ordinary choice of law rules cannot
create that necessity, the most obvious method is to use the existing
Oklahoma choice of law rules. The best argument against the continued
application of existing rules is that the amendment creates a presumption in
favor of forum law and against application of out-of-state law. But even if
this is the case, the method for determining when a party has overcome this
presumption is an issue for the courts to work out, and the sensible option is
to work it out through their familiar choice of law rules.
In sum, Oklahoma courts may find a variety of reasons to interpret the
amendment in a way that allows them to continue applying the state’s
choice of law statutes and doctrines, even though this interpretation
admittedly stretches the meaning of “if necessary.”

CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 govern the validity of a contractual choice of law). A court
conceivably could interpret Oklahoma’s statutory choice of law rule for contracts, 15 OKLA.
STAT. § 162 (2011), to override party autonomy outside the UCC context, but no reported
cases require or suggest such a result.
83. This is not to assert that choice of law doctrine in Oklahoma or anywhere else in the
United States is optimal, let alone coherent. Conflicts of law scholars have spent decades
criticizing, first, the older vested rights-based models for choice of law, reflected in
Oklahoma’s choice of law statute for contracts, see text at supra note 76, and, second, the
newer interest-based analyses, reflected in Oklahoma’s Restatement-based approach to torts
and some UCC issues, see Bernal 209 P.3d at 315-16; Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81
P.3d 618, 625 (Okla. 2003). The Save Our State Amendment is not even remotely
responsive to these various concerns.
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B. Forbidden Sources of Law
In addition to the catalog of permissible sources of law, the amendment
also includes several sources of law that are off limits. Oklahoma courts
“shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia
Law.”84 These two sentences raise a host of questions and difficulties.
1. “Shall Not Look To [or] Consider”
The amendment does not simply ban Oklahoma courts from
incorporating “the legal precepts of other nations or cultures,” international
law, or “Sharia Law” into Oklahoma jurisprudence. It also states that
courts cannot “look to” or “consider” these sources of law. In other words,
this part of the amendment appears to go beyond cataloging forbidden
sources for rules of decision. It also tells Oklahoma judges what they can
read in chambers when thinking about a case. Here again, the ideas of
distrust and contamination come to the fore. The logic behind this language
appears to be that to ensure the purity of Oklahoma law, one must also
ensure the purity of the judicial process, which means excluding impure
sources of law from judicial consideration, because the judges themselves
cannot be trusted to keep themselves pure. Whether this interpretation of
the amendment, if it is correct, squares with Oklahoma’s separation of
powers jurisprudence is a question beyond the scope of this essay,85 but it
certainly raises questions about the continued independence of judges in
Oklahoma.
More generally, this broad limitation is a bad idea. Until fairly recently,
American judges frequently looked to the judicial decisions or laws of other
countries, especially England, as part of an effort to craft the best possible
rules. These days, judges are more likely to limit themselves to the
jurisprudence of other U.S. states, but from time to time they still find the
case law of other countries to be interesting and relevant, with England
almost certainly still the most frequent source. Indeed, as noted in the
discussion of Oklahoma common law above, and stressed again below,
84. Save Our State Amendment, supra note 1.
85. With that said, if Oklahoma judges were to disregard or interpret away the
amendment—however understandably—then a different set of separation of powers
arguments would arise. As the conclusion to this essay underscores, however, the
amendment is not a clear text, and if it goes into effect, Oklahoma courts will have no choice
but to use their interpretive discretion, even though the amendment calls into question the
legitimacy of their discretion. Note, too, the fact that the Save Our State Amendment
changes the Oklahoma constitution perhaps renders any such arguments moot.
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Oklahoma courts still consider, cite, and even rely on English common
law.86 The Save Our State Amendment appears to prevent all of this. It not
only forbids judges from adopting the rules of other countries but also bars
them from discussing those rules in court opinions, even if such a
discussion would elucidate an important point. More than that, it bars them
from thinking about those rules, even when consideration of those rules
would lead to a more just conclusion. Or, if they do, they must do so
secretly, with a bad conscience, or as a form of silent resistance against the
law they are sworn to uphold, with the result that they will be at odds with
themselves, simultaneously performing and undermining their judicial role
and the rule of law.87
2. “The Legal Precepts Of”
The amendment also uses the term “legal precepts” to define the scope of
the forbidden sources of law. There is no obvious reason why the
amendment switches from the word “law” to the term “legal precepts”
when addressing “other nations or cultures.” Dictionaries define “legal
precept” as something along the lines of “a command or principle intended
especially as a general rule of action.”88 Oklahoma case law does not call
out the term “legal precept” as a precise or important term of art. It appears
rarely in judicial opinions, usually meaning something like a general
doctrinal rule89 but sometimes also referring to a broader idea of legal
constraints.90
The term, in short, may have no underlying purpose and may simply be a
variation of language. If, however, it is in the amendment for a reason, then
86. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text; infra note 91 and accompanying text.
87. See also supra note 87.
88. Precept, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/precept (last visited Oct. 23, 2012); see also Precept, FREE DICTIONARY,
http://thefreedictionary.com/precept (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (“a rule or principle
prescribing a particular course of action or conduct”); Precept, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/precept (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) (“a general rule
intended to regulate behaviour or thought”).
89. E.g., Cranford v. Bartlett, 25 P.3d 918, 923 (Okla. 2001); Cooper v. State, 924 P.2d
749, 750 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
90. E.g., Nesbit v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 440 P.2d 738, 743 (Okla. 1968)
(suggesting that certain ideas of attorney conduct and responsibility are “legal precepts . . .
of which the court takes judicial notice”); Edwards v. Carter, 29 P.2d 605, 605 (Okla. 1933)
(stating an argument is “contrary to all legal precepts”). In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Opala once quoted Roscoe Pound to suggest a distinction between legal precepts and
specific legal rules. See Bouziden v. Alfalfa Elec. Corp., 16 P.3d 450, 464 n.20 (Okla. 2000)
(Opala, J., dissenting).
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the intended meaning is not clear, although the best guess is probably
something like “general rules.” As for a background purpose, one could
argue that the goal of this language is, consistent with the contamination
theory, to make sure that nothing about the legal systems of “other nations
or cultures” will ever have anything to do with Oklahoma law. In other
words, not just the specific doctrines, but also all sources of law, whether
judicial, statutory, or constitutional, as well as the broader principles,
mindsets, or orientations of these other legal systems are proscribed.
As with other parts of the amendment, this is either a (bad) solution in
search of a problem or a form of (unnecessary) preemptive cultural defense.
Aside from English common law, Oklahoma courts have not shown any
signs of “look[ing] to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.” More
importantly, there is no indication that looking to these legal precepts would
have any negative effect on Oklahoma law.
3. “Other Nations or Cultures”
The phrase “the legal precepts of other nations of cultures” is odd
enough that one cannot be sure whether the amendment actually forbids
Oklahoma courts from considering the specific legal rules of another
country. But it is probably safe to assume that the ban on considering legal
precepts in general also includes the more focused ban on considering
specific legal doctrines, to the extent there is any meaningful distinction
between the two. One could perhaps develop the argument, however, not
only that there is a meaningful distinction but also that the amendment is
much more concerned with general approaches and mindsets than with
specific rules.
Be that as it may, this part of the amendment puts Oklahoma law at odds
with itself. Earlier, the amendment makes clear that “established common
law” is one of the permissible sources of law. Yet established common law
in Oklahoma includes the common law of England.91 Now, this part of the
amendment forbids looking to the law of other nations and thus forbids
Oklahoma courts from looking to the English law that is part of Oklahoma
law. Even more, while the amendment forbids courts from considering
foreign law going forward, it does not tell the courts what to do with the
Oklahoma common law jurisprudence that already takes English common
law into account. Is all of that case law no longer valid, so that courts no
longer can rely on it? Does it remain in effect, but judges must avert their
91. See McCormack v. Okla. Pub. Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1980); Gomes v.
Hameed, 184 P.3d 479, 494 n.14 (Okla. 2008) (Opala, J., dissenting).
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eyes from the contaminated passages?
Or is there an implicit
grandfathering idea that legitimates what has gone before but makes sure
that it will not happen in the future? Answers to these questions are not
readily apparent, but the grandfathering option is probably the least worst of
these choices.
Nor is it a sufficient response, I think, to respond that the amendment
does not apply to English law—or at least to English common law—
because it is part of what Oklahoma courts have sometimes referred to as a
larger “Anglo-American” legal system.92 Once the amendment sets up a
list of approved and forbidden sources of law, which includes categories
such as Oklahoma law, federal law, or the law of “other nations,” then there
is no place for something called “Anglo-American” law because the
amendment at least partly embraces a positivist idea of legal authority.
Different or larger claims of affiliation become less legitimate and at best
rhetorical—not to mention difficult to make in light of the additional bans
on “the legal precepts of other . . . cultures,” international law, and “Sharia
Law.”
Also worth noting—although largely beyond the scope of this essay—is
that the definition of “nation” is not as clear as it first appears. So far, this
essay has assumed that the amendment refers to countries that have
achieved sufficient recognition as independent states by the international
community. But the word “nation” is not so confined, and it can include “A
people who share common customs, origins, history, and frequently
language; a nationality,” as well as “A federation or tribe, especially one
composed of Native Americans.”93 Indeed, to the extent the amendment

92. A search on July 12, 2011 in LEXIS’s Oklahoma State Cases file turned up ninetyeight hits for “(anglo american),” although some of those hits were to the titles of books or
articles.
93. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, “nation” means:
1. a. A relatively large group of people organized under a single, usually
independent government; a country.
b. The territory occupied by such a group of people: All across the nation,
people are voting their representatives out.
2. The government of a sovereign state.
3. A people who share common customs, origins, history, and frequently
language; a nationality: “Historically the Ukrainians are an ancient nation
which has persisted and survived through terrible calamity” (Robert Conquest).
4. a. A federation or tribe, especially one composed of Native Americans.
b. The territory occupied by such a federation or tribe.
Nation, FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Nation (last visited Oct. 23,
2012) (quoting the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed., 2000).
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takes any account of Native American or Indian law—which it certainly
does not do in any express way—the “legal precepts of other nations or
cultures” would appear to be the place, and it is an exclusion.
If “nations” turns out to be more ambiguous a term than it first appears,
what about “cultures”? The subsequent reference to “Sharia Law” indicates
that “cultures” might include law associated with religious traditions, such
that “Jewish Halaka or Christian canon law” are also banned.94 It might
also bar so-called “cultural defenses” in criminal cases.95 Going further, the
term “cultures” overlaps with the expansive definition of “nation” that I
quoted above. Because the idea of “culture” can be very narrow and very
broad, defining and distinguishing among cultures is a difficult task.
Indeed, while the amendment refers to “other . . . cultures,” it does not
provide an express definition of the culture(s) against which others are
defined. Perhaps the distinction is between specifically Oklahoma culture
and more generally U.S. culture (because federal law and sometimes the
laws of other states are permissible) and other cultures.96 But if that is true,
then the game is already lost. It is not possible to define U.S. culture in any
way that is both coherent and that allows judges and lawyers to distinguish
it meaningfully from a host of “other . . . cultures.” For example, does a
legal rule derived from civil law represent a legal precept of a different
culture or is it consistent with or part of U.S. culture because Louisiana has
a strong civilian tradition in its law?97
In addition to these broad concerns, the ban on “look[ing] to the legal
precepts of other nations or cultures” also generates a series of specific
concerns. Section II.A.3 discusses issues of party autonomy, statutes, and
general choice of law principles with respect to the phrase “if necessary, the

94. Roger Alford, International Law Banned in Oklahoma State Courts, OPINIO JURIS
(Nov. 3, 2010), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/11/03/international-law-banned-in-oklahomastate-courts/ (response to comment). As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, however, it is not all
law associated with any religious tradition that would be banned, but only that of “other”
traditions. “The word ‘other’ implies that whatever religions the legislature considered to be
part of domestic or Oklahoma culture would not have their legal precepts prohibited from
consideration, while others would.” Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1129 (10th Cir. 2012)
95. For a good overview of the cultural defense and the major arguments for and against
it, see Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural
Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 915-21 (2007).
96. See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1129 (suggesting the amendment distinguishes between
“domestic or Oklahoma culture” and other cultures).
97. This discussion only begins to scratch the surface of the problems with the word
“other” in this context.
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law of another state of the United States” in the amendment.98 Those same
topics arise here as well. For example, what if two parties to a contract
agree that the law of Spain will apply to any disputes about their agreement
(perhaps because one party is from Spain and the other is from Oklahoma)?
Does the amendment require Oklahoma courts to override party autonomy
and disregard a provision of the contract, and instead apply Oklahoma law,
even though the choice of Spanish law may have been important to the final
deal? Even more, as discussed above, several Oklahoma statutes allow
party autonomy or establish choice of law rules.99 Does the amendment
override them if the law to be applied were that of another nation or
culture?100 And finally, sometimes Oklahoma choice of law jurisprudence
will indicate that the law of another country is most appropriate. Are courts
barred from following through on such a determination?
The answer to all of these questions may well be yes, because—unlike
the provision addressing the law of other states—there is no “if necessary”
savings clause for the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. The end
result could be substantial unfairness for litigants in Oklahoma courts
whose cases have international aspects.101 David Caron’s hypotheticals
make the point well:
Suppose an Oklahoma resident injures a foreign national while
driving abroad and that foreign national then files an action in
Oklahoma. What law applies to the merits? Suppose that the
plaintiff would prevail under Oklahoma law but not under the
law of the country in which the incident took place. What law
applies to the damages? Suppose that Oklahoma law would
award categories of damage not available under the law of the
foreign national.102

98. Save Our State Amendment, supra note 1.
99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. The UCC, as adopted by Oklahoma, specifically allows the choice of another
country’s law. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-301 (2011) (“[W]hen a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that
the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties.”).
101. As mentioned in the earlier discussion, it may be possible in such cases for
Oklahoma courts to decline jurisdiction or dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.
102. David D. Caron, The Save Our State Amendment and SCOTUS: Why We Go to
Miami, AM. SOC. OF INT’L LAW NEWSLETTER, July/Sept. 2010, at 1, 7, available at http://
works.bepress.com/david_caron/116.
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As this string of hypotheticals also makes clear, the bad consequences of
excluding the laws of other nations would not simply fall on foreigners.
Oklahoma litigants could end up being liable or paying more damages
under Oklahoma law than they would if the law of another country applied.
One might even conclude, in addition, that the bad consequences of this
aspect of the amendment have sufficient foreign relations implications to
raise the prospect of foreign affairs preemption. But unless the amendment
creates a conflict with federal law or policy, the only available form of
preemption is “dormant foreign affairs preemption,” which is not only rare
but also much criticized.103
4. “International Law”
The final, and best known, exclusion in the amendment is the ban on
“consider[ing] international law or Sharia Law.” For this provision, the
words of the amendment are not the only relevant text. The official ballot
title for the amendment provides addition information. With respect to
international law, it states:
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals
with the conduct of international organizations and independent
nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with their
relationship with each other. It also deals with some of their
relationships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized
nations. Sources of international law also include international
agreements, as well as treaties.104
This additional language is important because Oklahoma courts consult
the text of the official ballot title when interpreting constitutional
amendments.105 Thus, the ban on “consider[ing] international law” includes
103. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (articulating what has come to be
known as dormant foreign affairs preemption); see also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 259-82 (2007) (describing and criticizing
dormant foreign affairs preemption); Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law,
Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513, 544-46 (2002)
(summarizing reasons why dormant foreign affairs preemption is a weak doctrine); infra
note 126.
104. Okla. Exec. Order (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/
755.pdf.
105. See Venetis, supra note 6, at 5. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained,
When construing a constitutional amendment that was proposed by the
Legislature . . . this Court will read the ballot title together with the text of the
measure, even if the text of the measure contains no ambiguities or absurdities.
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“international agreements, as well as treaties,” and international law formed
by the general assent of civilized nations.
Initially, it is worth stressing again that the amendment is a solution in
search of a problem. Oklahoma courts rarely discuss, let alone rely on,
international law.106 But this part of the amendment does have several
potential consequences.
a) Treaties
Consider, first, the issue of treaties. The amendment (as explained by the
ballot title) bars consideration of treaties and international agreements.
Standing alone, that exclusion is not particularly problematic because state
courts usually have little reason to consult these sources. More specifically,
a state court likely would not consult treaties to which the United States is
not a party, unless those treaties provided evidence of the content of a rule
of customary international law.107 Such an inquiry is infrequent in most
state courts and apparently has never happened in a reported Oklahoma
decision.108
But the exclusion quickly becomes more problematic when one focuses
on treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a
party. The Supremacy Clause declares that “all treaties made, or which
This Court will do so because those who framed and adopted the amendment
considered the text of the measure and its ballot title together. The
understanding of the Legislature as the framers and of the electorate as the
adopters of the constitutional amendment is the best guide for determining an
amendment’s meaning and scope, and such understanding is reflected in the
language used in the measure and the ballot title.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. State Bd. of Equalization, 231 P.3d 638, 642 (Okla.
2009); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (10th Cir. 2012).
106. The term “international law” appears in eleven reported Oklahoma decisions, but it
is important to only one of those decisions: a case in which the court reached the merits of a
claim based on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations but denied relief with respect
to the criminal conviction, although the governor had already commuted the death penalty.
Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1187-88 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); see also infra note 115.
The term “customary international law” appears once in a reported Oklahoma decision, as
part of the description of the arguments based on the Vienna Convention made by the
Mexican government in an amicus brief concerning a Mexican national who was challenging
his death sentence. Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703, 708 n.20 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). The
court rejected the Vienna Convention arguments as faulty, but granted relief on other
grounds. Both results come from searches on July 13, 2011 in LEXIS’s Oklahoma State
Cases file.
107. For the debate over the extent to which state courts are able to articulate and apply
customary international law rules, see infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 106.
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shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.”109 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to
mean less than what it appears to say: “This Court has long recognized the
distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law,
and those that—while they constitute international law commitments—do
not by themselves function as binding federal law.”110 A treaty or one of its
provisions is self-executing “when it ‘operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision.’”111 By contrast, if the treaty or its provisions
“‘can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect,’”
then it is not self-executing and does not operate as a rule of decision for
courts.112
Supremacy Clause doctrine thus generates two different results with
respect to the amendment’s treatment of treaties. First, Oklahoma courts
must apply self-executing treaties and must apply non-self-executing
treaties if Congress has implemented them. Sometimes compliance with
congressional implementation comes down to following the relevant federal
statute (and thus applying federal law) but sometimes the statute will
specifically instruct courts to apply international law.113 The amendment’s
ban on considering treaties is, therefore, unconstitutional as applied to selfexecuting treaties or to federal statutes that require consideration of
international law, because it conflicts with the Supremacy Clause.
But, second, the Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to apply
non-self-executing treaty provisions,114 although they may do so in at least

109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
110. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008).
111. Id. at 505 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
112. Id. (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). For discussion of the
doctrine and its history, see John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the
Implementation of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209 (2009); Carlos M. Vázquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).
113. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a), (d) (2006) (conferring jurisdiction on state and federal
courts to enforce the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction and instructing them to “decide the case in accordance with the Convention”);
supra note 31 (discussing federal statute requiring courts to enforce arbitral awards that
comply with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards).
114. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504-05, 513-14.
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some circumstances.115 As a result, the amendment’s ban on consulting
treaties is valid as applied to non-self-executing treaties even though such
treaties are still the supreme (but not “binding”) law of the land. Critics of
the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties
accurately point out that the failure of states to comply with non-selfexecuting treaty provisions puts the United States in default of its
international law obligations. As a matter of Supreme Court doctrine,
however, the remedy lies with Congress to execute the treaty.
b) Customary International Law
The ballot title’s statement that “[t]he law of nations is formed by the
general assent of civilized nations” presumably refers to what is now called
customary international law (“CIL”), with the result that the amendment
also bans consideration of CIL by Oklahoma courts. One might respond
with the argument that Oklahoma has already received English common
law, and that English common law includes CIL, with the result that CIL is
already incorporated into Oklahoma law. But it is doubtful whether any
Oklahoma court has ever suggested this possibility and particularly not with
respect to the entirety of contemporary CIL. The most that one can imagine
an Oklahoma court (or indeed, nearly any U.S. court) accepting is that such
an argument applies only to CIL as it existed in the founding era.
The question whether federal law preempts this aspect of the amendment
is trickier because the status of CIL in the United States is less certain than
the status of treaties. The Supreme Court has declared that “[i]nternational
law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
115. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gautreaux, 941 N.E.2d 616, 625 (Mass. 2011) (adopting the
conclusions of the International Court of Justice with respect to obligations under Article 36
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations even though the Supreme Court has held
that the decisions of that court are not binding on U.S. courts); Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506
(Nev., Sept. 19. 2012) (unpublished decision ordering an evidentiary hearing in a death
penalty case based in part on an International Court of Justice opinion). In addition,
Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry took the ICJ’s Vienna Convention jurisprudence into
account when he commuted the death sentence of Osbaldo Torres. See supra note 106. That
decision was controversial, however, in part because critics claimed that Governor Henry
“bow[ed] ‘to pressure from the Mexican government,’ as well as pressure from ‘liberal and
international groups that oppose the death penalty.’” Janet Koven Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon: The Glass Is Half Full, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 37 n.34 (2007). Note that
constitutional issues conceivably could arise if state courts or officials used their
interpretations of non-self-executing treaties in a way that arguably interfered with the
federal foreign relations power. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (articulating
what has come to be known as dormant foreign affairs preemption).
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depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”116 Based on
statements like this, many commentators argue that CIL is not just “part of
our law” but is, more specifically, federal law (although opinions differ on
whether it is federal common law or some other form of federal law). If
CIL is federal law of some kind, then state and federal judges must apply it,
and it preempts inconsistent state laws.117 Some courts have agreed,
although one study asserts that they have done so “mostly in jurisdictional
contexts and have not generally considered [the] broader substantive
implications” of the general claim.118 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law also takes the position that CIL is federal law that overrides
state law.119 If these sources are correct—if CIL is automatically federal
law—then the amendment’s ban on using CIL is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause because CIL is supreme federal law.
But the idea that all of CIL is automatically federal law has suffered
sustained and effective criticism.120 For its part, the Supreme Court has

116. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
117. E.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 23739 (2d ed. 1996); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed. 2003). For a discussion of the founding era’s embrace of international law, see David M.
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the
Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010).
118. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816, 821 (1997). For
citations to federal court opinions stating that CIL is federal common law, see id. at 817 n.3,
837 n.150.
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
111 cmt. d & reporters’ note 3, 115 cmt. e (1987) (stating CIL is federal law, that it is “like
common law,” and that it overrides state law).
120. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 118; Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the
Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002). A prominent
defender of CIL’s status as federal law has summarized Bradley & Goldsmith’s criticisms as
follows:
Bradley and Goldsmith argued that the modern position should now be rejected
because it is based on a misinterpretation of pre-Erie decisions and is
inconsistent with “well-accepted notions of American representative
democracy, federal common law, separation of powers, and federalism,” and
because modern customary international law is problematic in a number of
respects. For most of the nation’s history, they argued, customary international
law was regarded as “general common law,” not federal law. After Erie
rejected the concept of general common law, customary international law could
have the status of domestic law only if it was given such status by the federal
political branches or by the States.
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held that CIL can be federal common law in at least some circumstances,121
but it has also emphasized the need “for great caution in adapting the law of
nations to private rights.”122 These cases can be read to suggest a narrower
approach: state courts do not operate under a constitutional mandate to
apply CIL unless the relevant CIL norms have been incorporated into
federal law in some affirmative fashion.123 Under this framework, state
courts remain free to apply CIL as part of their common law unless the
application of CIL is barred either by state law,124 as will be the case in
Oklahoma if the amendment ever takes effect, or by some other federal
interest.125
In sum, although it is clear that CIL norms sometimes operate as federal
law of some kind, it is less clear that they operate as federal law all or most
of the time. And if it is the case that CIL is not always preemptive federal
law, then the amendment’s ban on consulting federal law survives a facial
Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the
Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2011).
121. Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010) (holding official immunity claims
raised by foreign officials are “properly governed by the common law”); Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (holding the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 allows
federal courts to “recognize[e] a claim under the law of nations as an element of common
law”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) (indicating CIL can
be federal law but also rejecting a CIL rule in favor of an independent federal common law
rule); see also Vázquez, supra note 120, at 1538 (“Although the Court did not specify the
nature of this common law, the Court’s discussion [in Samantar] . . . leaves no doubt that it
regarded the relevant law as federal, not State, law.”); id. at 1546-47 (“The [Sosa] Court
proceeded to consider whether it was appropriate for the federal courts to create a cause of
action as a matter of federal common law.”).
122. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
123. See Meltzer, supra note 103, at 536-51 (arguing CIL is not automatically federal
common law but can be incorporated into federal common law); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. &
Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 93 (2009)
(arguing “some aspects of the law of nations . . . have functioned as preemptive federal law
because of the Constitution’s allocation of foreign relations powers in Articles I and II”).
Vázquez avoids the label “federal common law” out of concern that it suggests too
restrictive of an approach. See Vázquez, supra note 120, at 1509-11. Despite the title of
their article, Bellia & Clark hedge on whether they are articulating a theory of federal
common law, of constitutional common law, or a “constitutional rule of decision,” or of
some other form of “preemptive federal law.” See Bellia & Clark, supra note 123, at 8-9.
124. Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 118, at 870 (arguing that CIL can only operate
within state law).
125. See Vázquez, supra note 120, at 1626-30 (suggesting state court application of CIL
could be preempted if it conflicts with federal foreign affairs interests); see also Parry, supra
note 11.
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challenge. As applied in specific cases, however, the amendment’s ban
would be invalid if there is applicable CIL that has the status of federal
law.126
The amendment’s ban on international law raises at least one more
important issue. As David Caron and Duncan Hollis have pointed out, once
a state or federal court is confronted with a question of treaty interpretation,
it frequently will have to look at other sources of international law, as well
as the decisions of courts in other countries, to help resolve the issue.127
The amendment’s interaction with federal law creates the potential for a
situation in which an Oklahoma court could be required to apply a treaty
under federal law, despite the amendment, but would be unable to consult
the sources that best elucidate the treaty issues that the court faces, because
of the amendment. Perhaps Oklahoma courts would hold that the
amendment does not reach such a situation because the federal preemption
in the context of treaties includes the sources required to apply the treaty,
but neither the amendment nor Supremacy Clause doctrine makes that
result clear.
5. “Sharia Law”
The amendment states that Oklahoma courts “shall not consider . . .
Sharia Law,” and the ballot title states that “Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is
based on two principal sources, the Koran and the teaching of
Mohammed.”128 This prohibition, together with the reference to “Sharia
126. Carlos Vázquez suggests that that state court application of CIL could be preempted
under the dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968). See Vázquez, supra note 120, at 1626-30. One could also argue that Zschernig
prevents the amendment’s prohibitions on consulting international law or the law of other
nations or cultures from going into effect. See supra note 103. Federal courts likely would
reject the argument that this relatively weak doctrine preempts these specific provisions of
the amendment, because they do not target particular foreign policy issues and do not target
the law of a specific country. Cf. RAMSEY, supra note 103, at 259-82 (summarizing reasons
why Zschernig-style preemption is a weak doctrine); Meltzer, supra note 103, at 544-46
(same).
127. See Caron, supra note 102, at 1, 6; Duncan Hollis, Suing to Block Oklahoma’s
Constitutional Amendment, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 5, 2010), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/11/05/
suing-to-block-oklahomas-constitutional-amendment/. Caron and Hollis both refer to the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), in which all
nine justices signed on to opinions that discussed Chilean law and court decisions of other
countries as part of an effort to interpret the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, although the three dissenters questioned the weight that
should be given to such sources.
128. Save Our State Amendment, supra note 1.
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Law” when discussing the circumstances under which Oklahoma courts can
apply the law of other states, is the most controversial part of the
amendment. As the plaintiff argued, and the district court found in Awad v.
Ziriax, the amendment’s ban on considering Islamic Law likely violates
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause principles by singling out a
particular religion for unequal treatment and sending a message that there is
something illegitimate about Islam and Islamic law.129 As a result, under
federal constitutional doctrine the two references to “Sharia Law” in the
amendment are now unenforceable and are likely to remain so.130
Because this essay’s focus is on the choice of law aspects of the
amendment, however, it is worth considering how the amendment’s
references to “Sharia Law” would operate if they were to take effect. And,
importantly, the ban on “Sharia Law” would have limited effect. No
reported Oklahoma cases use the word “Sharia” or the term “Islamic law,”
and only two cases use the word “Islam,” both times in reference to the
Nation of Islam.131 This paucity of references makes sense, because it is
hard to see how a choice of law process would result in the selection of
“Sharia Law”—rather than, for example, the law of Indonesia (which the
amendment already bans as the law of another nation).
“Sharia Law” could come up in certain “child custody, divorce, and other
family law matters,” however.132 It could also make its way into Oklahoma
courts through the exercise of party autonomy. For example, the original
plaintiff in Awad v. Ziriax contended that he had standing to challenge the
amendment because his will directs that charitable bequests be made
according to “the proscribed limitations found in Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4,
Book 51, Number 7,” and that Oklahoma courts would not be able to
129. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305-07 (W.D. Okla. 2010). As noted
above, the Tenth Circuit affirmed on Establishment Clause grounds and did not consider
Free Exercise. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
130. It is not clear what impact this result would have if the rest of the amendment were
to go into effect. The amendment’s ban on the legal precepts of “other nations or cultures”
could be interpreted to ban all “laws” associated with “other” religious traditions, which
would include “Sharia Law.” See supra note 94 (describing the Tenth Circuit’s discussion
of this issue). If Oklahoma courts interpreted the amendment in this way, further litigation
over the constitutionality of that interpretation would follow.
131. See Grant v. State, 205 P.3d 1, 10 n.6 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009); Brooks v. State, 566
P.2d 147, 148 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). The results reported in the text come from searches
in LEXIS’s Oklahoma State Cases file on July 14, 2011 for “Sharia,” “Islamic Law,” and
“Islam.”
132. Plaintiff-Appellee Awad’s Response Brief at 32, Awad v. Ziriax, 670 P.3d 1111
(10th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-6273).
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probate his will if the amendment goes into effect.133 One of the new
plaintiffs in that case is an Imam, and he contends that the amendment
would force Oklahoma courts and other officials or entities that exercise
“adjudicative authority” to reject his credentials to perform marriages,
would override the state’s statutory priest-penitent privilege, and would
erase state tax exemptions commonly available to religious leaders and
institutions.134
The amendment’s definition of “Sharia Law” as “Islamic law . . . based
on . . . the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed” is also radically
incomplete—so much so that one could attack it as impermissibly vague.
As detailed in an earlier essay on the Save Our State Amendment litigation,
“[e]ven a schematic summary of standard scholarly accounts” demonstrates
that “Islamic law is not limited to these sources, and it is not a static,
unitary, or unchanging tradition.”135
Rather than adopt an accurate view of Islamic law, the Save Our State
Amendment propagates the idea that Islamic law derives from original
sources and not from a living tradition of interpretation. This is not only a
highly selective and misleading definition; it also matches with and
supports a popular conception in the United States that Islam is a set of
unchanging, pre-modern, and dangerous beliefs. But the amendment does
not simply ban this fantasy of Islamic law from Oklahoma courts. It also
fights back by insisting on the greater legitimacy of its own list of original
sources and, to at least some extent, traditional approaches. The
amendment creates an exclusive list of sources of law that Oklahoma courts
can apply by category and, arguably, in time; it also constrains judicial
discretion, preserves a formal notion of federalism, and keeps American
law free of any foreign taint. In this sense, and despite the fact that the
amendment’s simplistic and inaccurate conception of “Sharia Law” makes
it confusing and vague, the ban is also quite precise, for it seems clear that
the point was to defend against (by attacking) an image of “Islamic
fundamentalism.”
133. Plaintiff-Appellee Awad’s Response Brief, attachment 2 at 1-2, Awad, 670 P.3d
1111 (No. 10-6273). Sahih Bukhari is one of the important collections of hadith, which are
“an account of what the Prophet said or did, or of his tacit approval of something said or
done in his presence.” 3 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, NEW EDITION 23 (Bernard Lewis et
al. eds., 1986).
134. First Amended Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 64-82. Remember that the amendment
may apply not just to “courts” but also to “Boards, Agencies and Commissions” that
exercise “adjudicative authority.” See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
135. Parry, supra note 10, at 167, 168.
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C. The Save Our State Amendment and the Erie Doctrine
Under the Rules of Decision Act of 1948136 and Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,137 a federal court hearing a diversity case must apply state law as
the rule of decision, not federal or general law. Further, a federal district
court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.138
Thus, Oklahoma federal district courts must apply Oklahoma choice of law
rules.
Because the amendment functions in part as a choice of law statute, it
will change the way Oklahoma courts approach choice of law issues if it
goes into effect. Oklahoma’s federal courts will have to follow along. In
addition, any state or federal court that decides, under any choice of law
rules, that it must apply Oklahoma law will also have to take the
amendment into account when trying to decide the content of Oklahoma
law. If there is an open question of Oklahoma law, the amendment would
appear to constrain the sources to which a court can look in predicting the
new rule and perhaps also constrain the way in which courts think about
legal rules.
It may be, however, that although they are bound to apply Oklahoma
law, including the amendment if it goes into effect, federal courts will
interpret the amendment differently from state courts. In particular, they
may be more likely to interpret the amendment narrowly or to find that
portions of it are preempted by federal law.
Conclusion: Fatal Vagueness or Fundamental Change?
The goal of this essay has been to take the Save Our State Amendment
seriously as law and, more specifically, to consider its doctrinal effect as the
constitutionalization of a particular approach to choice of law. Seen in this
way, the amendment has the potential to reshape dramatically choice of law
jurisprudence in Oklahoma.
Yet the exact shape of the resulting jurisprudence is difficult to predict.
As this essay acknowledges, it is often difficult to determine a best
interpretation of the amendment. Oklahoma courts will have to decide
exactly what, among several choices, it means. There is some irony, of
course, to the idea that a state constitutional amendment designed in part to
reduce judicial discretion will end up enhancing and entrenching it. But it
seems there is something more to say as well. So many words and phrases
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
137. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
138. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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in the amendment are ambiguous that it is impossible for lawyers and
judges, let alone litigants, to know what the amendment means as a
statement of doctrine. Thus, it may be that in addition to the specific
constitutional challenges that would chip away at the amendment by
preventing portions of it from going into full effect, one could also make an
overarching challenge to the amendment as irrevocably shot through with
vagueness. (Or, one can hope that the federal courts will save the day by
determining, whether or not appropriately, that the amendment is not
severable.)
If other states follow were to Oklahoma’s specific path, the result would
be a significant reshaping of American choice of law. Choice of law
scholars have often debated the benefits of statutory approaches to choice
of law, and they have persuaded some state legislatures to enact a variety of
choice of law statutes.139 What they have not considered or sought are
changes in choice of law rules through popular initiative and in the
company of political agendas that have little to do with technical legal
doctrine, something to do with political conceptions of the judicial role, the
nature of law, and the legitimacy of various sources of law, and everything
to do with ideas of security, purity, and invented traditions.

139. For a brief summary of these debates and of the ways states have codified choice of
law rules, see James A.R. Nafziger, The Louisiana and Oregon Codifications of Choice-ofLaw Rules in Context, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 165 (2010).
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